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Abstract
Recent advancements of neural networks lead to reli-
able monocular depth estimation. Monocular depth
estimated techniques have the upper hand over tradi-
tional depth estimation techniques as it only needs one
image during inference. Depth estimation is one of the
essential tasks in robotics, and monocular depth esti-
mation has a wide variety of safety-critical applications
like in self-driving cars and surgical devices. Thus, the
robustness of such techniques is very crucial. It has
been shown in recent works that these deep neural net-
works are highly vulnerable to adversarial samples for
tasks like classification, detection and segmentation.
These adversarial samples can completely ruin the out-
put of the system, making their credibility in real-time
deployment questionable. In this paper, we investigate
the robustness of the most state-of-the-art monocular
depth estimation networks against adversarial attacks.
Our experiments show that tiny perturbations on an
image that are invisible to the naked eye (perturbation
attack) and corruption less than about 1% of an image
(patch attack) can affect the depth estimation drasti-
cally. We introduce a novel deep feature annihilation
loss that corrupts the hidden feature space representa-
tion forcing the decoder of the network to output poor
depth maps. The white-box and black-box test com-
pliments the effectiveness of the proposed attack. We
also perform adversarial example transferability tests,
mainly cross-data transferability.
Keywords: Monocular depth, Depth estimation, Ad-
versarial attack
1 Introduction
Per-pixel depth estimation from more than one two-
dimensional images is a well-explored research field in
computer vision. Recently the surge in estimating per-
pixel depth from a single two-dimensional image has in-
creased in the research community. Monocular depth
estimation poses a variety of real-world applications
like autonomous driving, robot navigation, and surgical
devices. Monocular depth estimation has been studied
in numerous settings like supervised, semi-supervised,
and self-supervised. The introduction of convolution
neural network (CNN) for depth estimation has helped
to gain significant improvement over other traditional
∗Equal contribution.
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Figure 1: Adversarial attacks on monocular depth estima-
tors. First row from left: Unattacked input image, Attacked
input image with adversarial perturbation, Attacked input
image with an adversarial patch. Second row from left:
Depth estimated with SFM [32] with Unattacked input im-
age, Attacked input image with adversarial perturbation,
Attacked input image with an adversarial patch. Third
row from left: Ground truth depth from LiDAR, Gap be-
tween unattacked depth and attacked depth with pertur-
bation and patch attack.
methods. The supervised method considered monoc-
ular depth estimation as a regression problem with
ground truth depth which are collected using devices
like LiDAR and RGBD camera. However ground truth
depth collection from these devices is a tedious task.
The devices used for this purpose has its own down-
falls. LiDAR produces a sparse depth map, and RGBD
cameras have limitations on the maximum depth it can
capture. The self-supervised method studies monocu-
lar depth estimation as a view synthesis problem us-
ing stereo images and/or video sequences. This view
synthesis acts as the supervision of the system. The
semi-supervised setting takes the best of both worlds
by using sparse depth maps and multi view images for
depth estimation.
Even though deep learning-based methods have
shown astonishing results in most computer vision
task, it has been shown that they are vulnerable to
attacks. The vulnerability of deep learning models for
tasks like image classification, detection, and segmen-
tation is extensively studied in the literature. However,
attacks on safety-critical models like depth estimation
are not investigated broadly. In this paper, we inves-
tigate the robustness of monocular depth estimators
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against adversarial attacks. We mainly examine pixel
perturbation and patch attack against a diverse set of
depth estimators. There are few works on adversarial
attacks on monocular depth estimation. But these at-
tacks only focus on classical perturbation attacks like
FGSM (Fast Gradient Sign Attack) and IFGSM (Itera-
tive FGSM). FGSM is one of the most straightforward
white-box adversarial attacks introduced in [10] which
uses the gradient of the loss with respect to the input
data, then adjusts the input data to maximize the loss.
FGSM is a one-shot method, whereas IFGSM takes
more than one gradient steps to find the perturbation.
Some of the drawbacks of these attacks are:
1. Perturbation attacks like FGSM are image depen-
dent and are not ideal for real-world attacks as it
needs access to the image captured by the system
to attack the model.
2. Defense against FGSM is more natural than adap-
tive perturbations generated by a network.
Existing adversarial attacks on classification, object
detection, and segmentation aim to maximize non-
essential softmax and minimize other softmax predic-
tions of the network, thereby flipping the final predic-
tion of the deep neural network. However, these at-
tacks don’t have a significant effect on the scene un-
derstanding models like depth estimation. Despite its
success in basic vision tasks like classification ,regres-
sion models can be attacked by these attacks to a very
limited extent. In this work, we introduce a deep fea-
ture annihilation loss for both perturbation and patch
attacks as shown in Figure 1. Deep feature annihila-
tion (DFA) loss corrupts the internal representation of
a deep neural network, rather than just the final layers.
Attacks with DFA have demonstrated a more substan-
tial effect on resultants. The main contributions of this
paper are:
1. Show the vulnerability of monocular depth esti-
mators against precisely calculated perturbation
added to the input image.
2. Study the effect of patch attack on monocular
depth estimators even when less than one percent
of the image pixels are corrupted.
3. Introdunce a novel Deep Feature Annihilation loss
for stronger attacks.
4. Conducted extensive white and black-box testing
for both perturbation and patch attack for monoc-
ular depth estimation.
5. Study the transferability of adversarial samples,
mainly cross-model transferability and cross data
transferability.
2 Related Works
2.1 Monocular Depth Estimation
Zhou et al., [32] proposed an unsupervised depth es-
timation end-to-end framework from video sequence
where view synthesis act as the supervisory signal.
Godard et al., [8] estimate disparity from stereo im-
ages with a novel LR consistency loss. Mahjourian et
al., [19] introduced a 3D loss to enforce consistency of
the estimated 3D point cloud. Yin et al., [30] jointly
learned monocular depth, optical flow and ego motion
from videos in unsupervised manner. Luo et al., [18]
also jointly learned monocular depth, optical flow and
ego motion from video but used these result to pro-
duce motion mask, occlusion mask, 3D motion map
for rigid background and dynamic objects. Wang et
al., [28] proposed novel depth normalization strategy
that substantially improves performance of the estima-
tor. Godard et al., [9] achieved state of the art results
in KITTI rectified dataset with minimum reprojection
loss, full-resolution mutli-scale sampling and a mask
that ignores training pixels that violate camera motion
assumptions. Bian et al., [3] proposes a scale consis-
tent loss and a mask to handle moving and occluded
objects. Lee et al., [17] introduce a network architec-
ture that utilizes novel local planer guidance layers to
guide densely encoded features to estimate depth.
2.2 Adversarial Attack
In [27] Szegedy et al. shows that numerous state of
the art neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial
samples. Attacking a neural network with adversar-
ial samples is called an adversarial attack. Adversarial
attacks strive to make small perturbation in the net-
work input so that it causes erroneous results. Attacks
are mainly two types: perturbation attack and patch
attack. The perturbation attack adds minute changes
to pixels values so that its indistinguishable from the
clean image but affects the prediction accuracy of the
model. Patch attack adds a small patch that usually
occupies less than one percent of the image and makes
the result inaccurate. The drawback of the perturba-
tion attack is that the attack needs to have access to
the system to modify the image with the adversarial
sample. Patch attacks succeed in this issue and can be
placed at an apparent location in the scene to attack
the model.
Goodfellow et al. [10] introduced a fast and straight-
forward perturbation attack called Fast Gradient Sign
Attack (FGSM) that uses gradient with respect to in-
put and adjust the input data to maximize the loss.
Nguyen et al. [20] shows how easy it is to generate
adversarial samples that are undetectable to the hu-
man eye. They have also shown completely unrecog-
nizable attacked images classified with a high degree of
confidence. Su et al. [25] reveals that even attacking
a single pixel can change the classification prediction.
[16] demonstrates a real physical adversarial attack in
which a printed adversarial example can also affect the
prediction correctness. [1] reflects the existence of 3D
adversarial samples, which can fool classification mod-
els in different viewpoints, transformations, and cam-
eras. [23] fooled facial recognition system with adver-
sarial glasses and [6] ticked stop sign classifier by plac-
ing adversarial stickers over it.
2
2.3 Adversarial Attack on Scene Un-
derstanding
Adversarial attacks in tasks like detection, semantic
segmentation, and reinforcement learning are studied
in [2, 11, 29]. We mainly focus on attacks toward scene
understanding tasks like depth estimation. Ranjan et
al. [22], shows the effect of adversarial patch attack on
optical flow estimation. They have demonstrated that
corrupting less than one percent of the pixels with a
patch can deteriorate the prediction quality. The ef-
fect of adversarial patch extends beyond the region
of the attack in some of the optical flow estimation
models. In essence, the encoder-decoder architecture
based models found to be more sensitive than spa-
tial pyramid architecture. They also visualized feature
maps of successful and failed attacks to understand the
essence under the hood. Hu et al. [12] studies ba-
sic perturbation attacks like IFGSM (Iterative FGSM)
on monocular depth estimation and also proposes a
defense mechanism based on [13]. The perturbations
non-salient parts are marked out to defend against the
attack. Zhang et al. [31] explores basic perturbation
attacks with FGSM, IFGSM, and MI-FGSM (Momen-
tum IFGSM) for non-targetted, targeted, and universal
attack in monocular depth estimation. In contrast, we
investigate global and image dependent perturbation
with a novel DFA loss that attacks deep feature maps
rather than final activation like [12] and [31]. We also
conducted an extensive study adversarial patch attacks
on monocular depth estimators, which are more signifi-
cant in a real-world attack. The transferability of both
global perturbation and patch are studied in this work.
3 Approach
The robustness of a model that predicts depth from
one or more images is considered to be a safety-critical
task. We aim to optimize pixel intensity change in an
image so that it affects the final prediction of the depth
estimation models. These pixel intensity changes can
occur in mainly two ways:
1. Adding a small perturbation to the clean image
in a way that it’s indistinguishable from the clean
image as briefed in Section 3.1.
2. Corrupting few pixels, usually less than 1% in the
image as briefed in Section 3.2.
Say D ∈ Rh×w where D(x, y) is the ground truth
depth value at pixel location (x, y) where x ∈ Zh+, y ∈
Zw+ of a clean image I ∈ Rh×w×3, the attacked adver-
sarial image I˜ ∈ Rh×w×3 will force the model to pre-
dict a wrong estimate D˜ ∈ Rh×w with a constraint that
I(x, y) ≈ I˜(x, y) and h,w is the height and width of the
image. Though an adversarial sample can be created
against the objective by maximizing the loss between
predicted and ground-truth value, but ground truth
depth maps are scarce. Widely popular autonomous
dataset like KITTI [7] provides sparse LiDAR ground
truth but are very limited in number. The indoor NYU
dataset [24] consists of dense depth ground truth, but
the depth range are limited to the RGBD camera.
Ground truth data collected from devices like Sonar,
Radar, and Lidar can be used to train a supervised
depth estimation model. But supervised depth learn-
ing requires a vast amount of ground truth depth data,
and these depth sensors have their error and noise char-
acteristics, which will affect the learning process of the
deep neural network. 3D lasers depth sensors mea-
surements are typically much sparser than the image
and thus lack detailed depth inference. These sensors
also require accurate calibration and synchronization
with the cameras. Rather than relying on ground truth
depth information, an alternative approach to train a
model to estimate depth is by self-supervised fashion
using stereo image pairs and/or video streams from a
single camera. The self-supervision signal comes from
the loss between the synthesized view and the target
view. View synthesis is another extensively explored
problem in computer vision, where the objective is
to reconstruct a specific view from one or more given
views.
As all state of the art approaches are self-supervised,
in this investigation we study five self-supervised
monocular depth estimators, namely, SFM (Structure
from motion) [32], SCSFM (Scale-Consistent SFM) [3],
Monodepth1 [8], DDVO (Direct Depth Visual Odom-
etry) [28], Monodepth1 [8], Monodepth2 [9], and
B2F [14]. SFM, SCSFM, DDVO, B2F and Mon-
odepth2 learns depth from monocular video but Mon-
odepth1 uses stereo images. Monodepth2 also extends
there work to stereo and stereo + videos training. Due
to the limited availability of ground truth data, the
depth network prediction of the clean image is taken
as pseudo ground truth. Using these pseudo ground
truths for attack makes it easy to attack a model in
the absence of actual ground truth.
Models Perturbation constrain
η = 0.01 η = 0.05 η = 0.1
SFM [32]
DDVO [28]
B2F [14]
SCSFM [3]
Mono1 [8]
Mono2 [9]
Figure 2: Adversarial perturbation generated to attack each
models under different η.
3.1 Perturbation Attack
A depth network M that estimates depth D from a
single image I ∈ Rh×w×3 as shown in Equ. 1, is at-
3
tacked by adding a perturbation α ∈ Rh×w to I as
shown in Equ. 3. The perturbation α is constrained
with η when added to an image to make the added
perturbation unapparent to the naked eye as shown in
Equ. 2. The perturbation is designed to be undetected
in the attacked image I˜, and the attacked image looks
as close as possible to the clean image I. The response
of the network M at attacked image I˜ is D˜.
D = M(I) (1)
I˜ = Adv(I, α, η) = I + η ∗ α (2)
D˜ = M(Adv(I, α, η)) (3)
We basically experiment with two forms of pertu-
bation namely global αG and image-specific αI per-
tubation. A perturbation network P is used to gen-
erate image-specific or global perturbation. P is a
trivial encoder-decoder architecture based deep neu-
ral network. The image-specific perturbation network
is trained with an unattacked image as input like
αI = P (I). This perturbation needs access to the input
image to generate a perturbation noise which makes it
less suitable for real-world attack (qualitative analy-
sis in Supplementary material). However the global
perturbation network is trained with random noise as
input like αG = P (N ) where N ∼ U(0, 1) ∈ Rh×w.
This perturbation has a higher chance of attacking a
system in real world as compared to image-specific per-
turbation, thus in this investigation we focus on global
pertubation. Both image-specific and global perturba-
tion are optimized by minimizing DFA loss (see Section
3.3). The optimized global pertubations for monocular
depth estimators with different η is shown in Figure 2.
3.2 Patch Attack
A depth network M which estimates depth D from a
single image I ∈ Rh×w×3 is attacked by placing an
adversarial patch β ∈ RH×W on the image I at loca-
tion ξ as shown in Equ. 4 where H,W is less than
1% of image size h,w. Transformations ω includes
rotation and scaling are applied on the patch β ran-
domly to make the patch invariant to these transfor-
mations. The response of the network M at attacked
image Adv(I, β, ω, ξ) is D˜.
D˜ = M(Adv(I, β, ω, ξ)) (4)
Adversarial patches are generated by optimizing ran-
dom noise initialized with N ∼ U(0, 1) ∈ RH×W by a
neural network. The optimization minimizes DFA (see
Section 3.3) to create global patches that are apt for
real-world attacks. The square patches we optimized
for monocular depth estimators are of different sizes
i.e., 50× 50, 60× 60, 72× 72 and 100× 100 which are
approximately 0.5%, 0.75%, 1% and 2% of the original
KITTI image size 1242× 375 as shown in Figure 3.
3.3 Deep Feature Annihilation loss
As compared to networks for tasks like classification
and detection, regression networks are much more dif-
Models Patch size
50× 50 60× 60 72× 72 100× 100
SFM [32]
DDVO [28]
B2F [14]
SCSFM [3]
Mono1 [8]
Mono2 [9]
Figure 3: Adversarial patches of different sizes optimized
to attack each models.
ficult to attack, especially depth estimation networks.
To deal with this issue, we introduce a novel DFA loss
Ldfa, which attacks the internal feature representation
of the input image. Note that we are optimizing the
following objective after every convolution layer spar-
ing few initial encoder layers.
Fl = F
att
l × F orgl (5)
Ldfa =
∑
l
log[1 + E(F 2l )− E(Fl)2)]Wl (6)
The aim is to minimize the variance of correla-
tion between the features maps F orgl and F
att
l where
F orgl , F
att
l are the activations obtained from layer l in
the depth network M after passing the unattacked im-
age and attacked image through the network, respec-
tively weighted with an empirically found Wl . This
objective forces non-dominant activation values to in-
crease while forcing the dominant activation values
to decrease, resulting in the reduction of variance as
shown in Figure 9. Variance reduction ends up costing
network much semantic information, which makes the
decoder incompetent to propagate useful information
to output proper depth map. We have experimented
by limiting the loss to just a variance reduction of F attl ;
however, our objective of minimizing the variance of
correlations works much better in practice.
4 Experiments
Adversarial attacks can be categorized mainly in two
ways: the desired perturbation type and assumption
4
Attacked image Clean depth Attacked depth Depth gap
SF
M
D
D
V
O
B
2F
SC
SF
M
M
on
o1
M
on
o2
Figure 4: White-box patch test with patch size 50× 50.
Methods Clean
Attacked
50× 50 60× 60 72× 72 100× 100
RMSE RMSE Rel (%) RMSE Rel (%) RMSE Rel (%) RMSE Rel (%)
SFM [32] 6.1711 6.6232 8 7.844 28 8.8061 43 9.2719 51
DDVO [28] 5.5072 5.963 9 6.3477 16 6.9496 27 7.5986 45
B2F [14] 5.1615 5.5533 8 5.7199 11 6.1145 18 6.6022 28
SCSFM [3] 5.2271 6.4036 23 6.7562 30 7.1606 37 8.0283 54
Mono1 [8] 5.1973 5.7658 11 6.0623 17 6.2326 20 7.1151 37
Mono2 [9] 4.9099 5.3133 9 5.4127 11 5.5343 13 6.1714 26
Table 1: White-box patch attack at different patch sizes. Root mean square error (RMSE) of each model with and
without adversarial attack and relative degradation (Rel) of RMSE on KITTI 2015.
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Figure 5: White-box perturbation test when η = 0.05.
of the attacker’s knowledge. Two perturbation types
used in this investigation are briefed in Section 3.1 and
Section 3.2. In this section, the kinds of assumptions of
the attacker’s knowledge will be discussed, particularly,
white-box and black-box attack.
4.1 White-box Attack
In a white-box attack, the attacker has full knowl-
edge and access to the target model, including net-
work architecture, input, output, and weights. We op-
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Methods Clean
Attacked
η = 0.01 η = 0.05 η = 0.1
RMSE RMSE Rel (%) RMSE Rel (%) RMSE Rel (%)
SFM [32] 6.1711 6.2619 2 8.2988 35 10.1711 75
DDVO [28] 5.5072 5.6649 3 10.9875 100 18.3904 234
B2F [14] 5.1615 5.2876 3 6.7341 31 10.2199 99
SCSFM [3] 5.2271 5.277 1 6.5294 25 9.8324 89
Mono1 [8] 5.1973 5.2217 1 6.8002 31 12.0708 133
Mono2 [9] 4.9099 4.9984 2 9.8473 101 13.5497 176
Table 2: White-box perturbation attack at different pertubation contrains η.
Clean image Attacked image
Clean depth Attacked depth Depth gap
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Figure 6: Black box perturbation test with η = 0.05.
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Figure 7: Black box for adversarial patch of size 72× 72.
timized adversarial samples in both perturbation and
patch type. Generated perturbation is the same size
as the input image of the target model. The perturba-
tion was optimized in such a way that it is imperceiv-
able to our naked eye. The perturbation added to the
input image is constrained in our experiments in the
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Perturbation
SFM [32] DDVO [28] B2F [14] SCSFM [3] Mono1 [8] Mono2 [9]
Methods RMSE Rel (%) RMSE Rel (%) RMSE Rel (%) RMSE Rel (%) RMSE Rel (%) RMSE Rel (%)
SFM [32] - - 6.818 11 6.3894 4 6.2981 3 6.2668 2 6.5082 6
DDVO [28] 6.3922 17 - - 6.1185 12 5.7431 5 5.7929 6 6.0563 10
B2F [14] 5.8541 14 5.9961 17 - - 6.0593 18 5.5322 8 5.772 12
SCSFM [3] 5.6802 9 5.7216 10 5.9632 15 - - 5.4092 4 5.6468 9
Mono1 [8] 5.2791 2 5.5388 7 5.4201 5 5.4602 6 - - 5.4485 5
Mono2 [9] 5.7929 18 5.7408 17 5.526 13 5.6306 15 5.2432 7 - -
Table 3: Black-box perturbation attack when η = 0.05.
Patch
Clean SFM [32] DDVO [28] SCSFM [3] Mono1 [8] Mono2 [9]
Methods RMSE RMSE Rel (%) RMSE Rel (%) RMSE Rel (%) RMSE Rel (%) RMSE Rel (%)
SFM [32] 6.1711 - - 7.5362 23 6.3677 4 6.7395 10 6.2181 1
DDVO [28] 5.5072 5.9095 8 - - 5.6998 4 5.7942 6 5.5974 2
B2F [14] 5.1615 5.7002 11 5.6992 11 5.6442 10 5.5763 9 5.374 5
SCSFM [3] 5.2271 6.599 27 6.5846 26 - - 6.5564 26 5.2272 0
Mono1 [8] 5.1973 6.1638 19 5.9163 14 5.8969 14 - - 5.5173 3
Mono2 [9] 4.9099 5.4502 12 5.4289 11 5.4155 11 5.5037 13 - -
Table 4: Black-box attack for adversarial patch of size 72× 72.
Clean image Attacked image Clean depth Attacked depth Depth gap
Figure 8: Cross-data transferability. KITTI [7] dataset adversarial patch used to attack images from Cityscape [4]
dataset.
range of [0.01, 0.1] as shown in Figure 14 and Table 2.
For patch type attack we generate square adversarial
patches on each network independently. All patches
estimated for these networks are global, i.e., doesn’t
depend on the image where it is pasted. Each patch is
augmented to make it invariant to rotation and loca-
tion. Rotation is sampled randomly from n× pi2 where
n ∈ Z+ : 0 ≤ n ≤ 4 and location from ξ(x, y) where
(x, y) ∈ Z+ : 0 ≤ x ≤ w, 0 ≤ y ≤ h. The patch and
perturbation are optimized with 45000+ image frames
from the KITTI dataset. The output from the respec-
tive pretrained model in response to the clean image is
treated as pseudo ground truth to optimize the adver-
sarial sample. Then the DFA loss between network’s
responses from a clean image and an attacked image
is minimized. Stochastic Gradient Descent (SDG) [26]
with learning rate 0.01 and Adam [15] with learning
rate 0.001, β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999 are used to optimize
perturbation and patch, respectively, in PyTorch [21].
4.2 Black-box Attack
In a black-box attack, the attacker has access to in-
put and output but not to target network architecture
and weights. The black-box attack is the most real-
istic attack, especially in safety-critical applications.
These applications are designed in such a way that the
attacker doesn’t have direct access to the system. A
global perturbation and patch learned from different
models in the investigation are used for this attack.
The global adversarial sample is optimized like a white-
box attack. Even though adversarial samples are suc-
cessful in attacking deep learning models with small
perturbation or by corrupting few pixels, the transfer-
ability property of the adversarial samples makes it a
severe threat. It has been shown that adversarial sam-
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Clean features
conv5 conv6 conv7 iconv1 iconv2 iconv3 iconv4 iconv5 iconv6 iconv7 disp1 disp2 disp3 disp4
Attacked features
conv5 conv6 conv7 iconv1 iconv2 iconv3 iconv4 iconv5 iconv6 iconv7 disp1 disp2 disp3 disp4
Figure 9: Layer-wise SFM [32] feature visualization. ‘convx’ are encoder layers and ‘iconvx’ are decoder layers.
ples are cross-model transferable i.e., adversarial per-
tubation optimized to attack Model A can be used to
attack Model B which deals with the same task. Let
Model A be an open-sourced model trained to estimate
per-pixel depth from an image, with the transferabil-
ity property; an attacker can attack a closed Model
B effectively using Model A’s adversarial samples. In
this study, we analyzed the transferability of the ad-
versarial sample across all models under investigation.
We also study cross-data transferability of the learned
patch as shown in Figure 8. Cross-data transferabil-
ity examines how well an adversarial sampled can be
optimized with a publicly available dataset A to at-
tack a model on proprietary data. The adverisal patch
learned from KITTI dataset was used to attack images
from Cityscape [4], considering KITTI as open source
data and cityscape as proprietary data. This transfer-
ability assures that publicly available data can be used
to attack almost any related models.
4.3 Evaluation
The qualitative evalution of the attacks are conducted
using metrics in [5] with KITTI 2015 dataset [7]. Root
mean square error (RMSE) along with relative degra-
dation (Rel) of RMSE are used to measure the vulner-
ability of the depth networks (Absolute relative error
metric in supplementary material). As shown in Ta-
ble 1 and Table 2, its evident that all state-of-the-art
models are vulnerable to adversarial samples in white-
box attacks. Our adversarial perturbation could attack
all models very well and in few networks like DDVO
and Mono2 just 5% of corruption could cause more
than 100% damage to the depth maps. We can also
see that corrupting less than even 1% of the image
using the adversarial patch can cause more than 20%
damage in the estimated depth map and also the dam-
age extends significantly beyond the region of the patch
thus making it a very dangerous real world attack. The
qualitative result in Table 3 and Table 4 assure success-
ful black-box attack on all state-of-the-art monocular
depth estimation networks.
4.4 Analyze Deep Features
Unlike most adversarial attacks, in this investigation,
we corrupt the network’s internal representation of an
input image with our perturbation. In our experiment,
striking the final layer alone didn’t affect the prediction
drastically for monocular depth estimation. The ad-
versarial samples generated from existing methods still
preserve a high level of input information in its deep
hidden layers. These extracted features obstruct the
desired attack in the model. To counter this issue, we
targeted deep features representation of the input im-
age to generate adversarial noise. We visualized deep
features of attacked and clean image in Figure 9. For
better visualization, feature outputs of zero image are
taken as a clean image, and perturbation added to zero
image is considered as an attacked image. It shows how
each network layer reacts to the clean image and how
the decoder layers react to an attacked image and ex-
hibit an activation inversion property. From the visu-
alization we can see that suppressed and non-dominant
activations are exaggerated while dominant activations
are weakened thus justifying our earlier claim. DFA
makes the internal feature representation hollow and
thereby creating a more robust attack on the final pre-
diction of the network.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed an effective adversarial at-
tack on monocular depth estimators. We explored
both perturbation and patch type attacks in this study.
The adversarial samples are designed with DFA loss
to destroy the internal representation of the network,
thereby resulting in a more vigorous attack. The at-
tacks are evaluated extensively with white-box and
black-box testing on KITTI dataset. The deep features
of the network are visualized for a better understanding
of the proposed attack. Also, cross-data transferability
of the attack is examined.
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Supplementary Material:
Monocular Depth Estimators: Vulnerabilities and Attacks
1 White-box attack
1.1 Patch attack
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Figure 10: White-box patch test with sample of size 60× 60.
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Figure 11: White-box patch test with patch size 72× 72.
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Figure 12: White-box patch test with patch size 100× 100.
Methods Clean
Attacked
50× 50 60× 60 72× 72 100× 100
Absrel Absrel Rel (%) Absrel Rel (%) Absrel Rel (%) Absrel Rel (%)
SFM [32] 0.1755 0.1887 8 0.2088 19 0.2193 25 0.2345 34
DDVO [28] 0.1488 0.1517 2 0.1519 3 0.1575 6 0.1712 16
B2F [14] 0.1358 0.153 13 0.1573 16 0.1573 16 0.1697 25
SCSFM [3] 0.1283 0.1533 20 0.1652 29 0.1759 38 0.2046 60
Mono1 [8] 0.1095 0.1166 7 0.1205 11 0.1271 17 0.1423 30
Mono2 [9] 0.1123 0.1239 11 0.1263 13 0.1317 18 0.1513 35
Table 5: White-box patch attack at different patch sizes.
1.2 Perturbation attack
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Figure 13: White-box perturbation test when η = 0.01
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Methods Clean
Attacked
η = 0.01 η = 0.05 η = 0.1
Absrel Absrel Rel (%) Absrel Rel (%) Absrel Rel (%)
SFM [32] 0.1755 0.1955 12 0.4069 132 0.5913 237
DDVO [28] 0.1488 0.1568 6 0.7291 390 1.2197 720
B2F [14] 0.1358 0.1448 7 0.3725 175 0.4574 237
SCSFM [3] 0.1283 0.133 4 0.3389 165 0.4874 280
Mono1 [8] 0.1095 0.1115 2 0.2678 145 0.4341 297
Mono2 [9] 0.1123 0.1192 7 0.4037 260 0.4503 301
Table 6: Absolute Relative Error for white-box test on image specific perturbation attack.
Methods Clean
Attacked
η = 0.01 η = 0.05 η = 0.1
RMSE RMSE Rel (%) RMSE Rel (%) RMSE Rel (%)
SFM [32] 6.1711 6.6009 7 10.4535 70 12.3833 101
DDVO [28] 5.5072 5.7871 6 13.4231 144 18.662 239
B2F [14] 5.1615 5.4437 6 10.2015 98 12.2744 138
SCSFM [3] 5.2271 5.3731 3 9.35 79 12.5616 141
Mono1 [8] 5.1973 5.1973 0 8.8863 71 13.4931 160
Mono2 [9] 4.9099 5.0419 3 13.2947 171 14.7999 202
Table 7: RMSE for white-box test on image specific perturbation attack.
Methods Clean
Attacked
η = 0.01 η = 0.05 η = 0.1
Absrel Absrel Rel (%) Absrel Rel (%) Absrel Rel (%)
SFM [32] 0.1755 0.1783 2 0.2651 52 0.3975 127
DDVO [28] 0.1488 0.1526 3 0.5703 284 1.1942 703
B2F [14] 0.1358 0.1411 4 0.2213 63 0.3783 179
SCSFM [3] 0.1283 0.13 2 0.1834 43 0.3272 156
Mono1 [8] 0.1095 0.1102 1 0.1794 64 0.3659 235
Mono2 [9] 0.1123 0.1167 4 0.2826 152 0.3984 225
Table 8: Absolute Relative Error for white-box test on global perturbation attack.
Methods Clean
Attacked
η = 0.01 η = 0.05 η = 0.1
Absrel Absrel Rel (%) Absrel Rel (%) Absrel Rel (%)
SFM [32] 0.1755 0.1802 3 0.2023 16 0.2316 32
DDVO [28] 0.1488 0.1558 5 0.1763 19 0.1947 31
B2F [14] 0.1358 0.1491 10 0.1905 41 0.2158 59
SCSFM [3] 0.1283 0.1436 12 0.1707 34 0.1846 44
Mono1 [8] 0.1095 0.1175 8 0.1472 35 0.1711 57
Mono2 [9] 0.1123 0.133 19 0.1696 52 0.2052 83
Table 9: Absolute relative error of white-box FGSM attack.
Methods Clean
Attacked
η = 0.01 η = 0.05 η = 0.1
RMSE RMSE Rel (%) RMSE Rel (%) RMSE Rel (%)
SFM [32] 6.1711 6.2857 2 6.8239 11 7.4746 22
DDVO [28] 5.5072 5.7242 4 6.2509 14 6.6626 21
B2F [14] 5.1615 5.349 4 5.9803 16 6.4383 25
SCSFM [3] 5.2271 5.3107 2 5.5715 7 5.9258 14
Mono1 [8] 5.1973 5.347 3 5.9713 15 6.5298 26
Mono2 [9] 4.9099 5.4985 12 6.1803 26 6.891 41
Table 10: RMSE of white-box FGSM attack.
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Figure 14: White-box perturbation test when η = 0.05.
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Figure 15: White-box perturbation test when η = 0.1
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2 Black-box attack
Patch
Clean SFM [32] DDVO [28] SCSFM [3] Mono1 [8] Mono2 [9]
Methods Absrel Absrel Rel (%) Absrel Rel (%) Absrel Rel (%) Absrel Rel (%) Absrel Rel (%)
SFM [32] 0.1755 - - 0.1962 12 0.1858 6 0.191 9 0.1803 3
DDVO [28] 0.1488 0.1488 0 - - 0.1514 2 0.1496 1 0.1577 6
B2F [14] 0.1358 0.1422 5 0.1425 5 0.1432 6 0.1401 4 0.1444 7
SCSFM [3] 0.1283 0.1448 13 0.1477 16 - - 0.1462 14 0.1343 5
Mono1 [8] 0.1095 0.1265 16 0.12 10 0.119 9 - - 0.115 6
Mono2 [9] 0.1123 0.1136 2 0.116 4 0.1189 6 0.1146 3 - -
Table 11: Black-box patch attack with patch size 72× 72.
Perturbation
SFM [32] DDVO [28] B2F [14] SCSFM [3] Mono1 [8] Mono2 [9]
Methods Absrel Rel (%) Absrel Rel (%) Absrel Rel (%) Absrel Rel (%) Absrel Rel (%) Absrel Rel (%)
SFM [32] - - 0.1842 5 0.181 4 0.1775 2 0.1775 2 0.1859 6
DDVO [28] 0.1799 21 - - 0.1675 13 0.1534 4 0.1598 8 0.1667 13
B2F [14] 0.1675 24 0.5703 284 - - 0.1724 27 0.1553 15 0.1643 21
SCSFM [3] 0.1512 18 0.161 26 0.165 29 - - 0.1413 11 0.1565 22
Mono1 [8] 0.1147 5 0.124 14 0.1242 14 0.1255 15 - - 0.1228 13
Mono2 [9] 0.1401 25 0.1452 30 0.1454 30 0.1519 36 0.129 15 - -
Table 12: Black-box perturbation attack when η = 0.05
3 Feature visualization
Clean features
conv1 conv2 conv3 conv4 conv5 conv6 conv7 iconv1 iconv2
iconv3 iconv4 iconv5 iconv6 iconv7 disp1 disp2 disp3 disp4
Attacked features
conv1 conv2 conv3 conv4 conv5 conv6 conv7 iconv1 iconv2
iconv3 iconv4 iconv5 iconv6 iconv7 disp1 disp2 disp3 disp4
Figure 16: Layer-wise B2F [14] feature visualization. ‘convx’ are encoder layers and ‘iconvx’ are decoder layers.
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